Cournot Model of Duopoly with Incomplete Information
Abstract
Cournot (1838) anticipated Nash's definition of equilibrium by over a century, but only in the context of a particular model of duopoly. Not surprisingly, Cournot's work is one of the classics of game theory; it is also one of the cornerstones of the theory of industrial organization. We consider a modification of the Cournot's model with an uncertainty in the demand. We find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game.
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PDFDOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21533/scjournal.v1i1.71
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Copyright (c) 2015 SouthEast Europe Journal of Soft Computing
ISSN 2233 -1859
Digital Object Identifier DOI: 10.21533/scjournal
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License